Dear Friend of Israel:
Do you know any Jewish Democrats who are still supporting President Obama's Iran Deal? Many still are . . . but the question is, why?
Over the last few weeks, a number of Jewish Democrats—all supporters of Israel—have complained to me about our recent FLAME Hotline letters, in which I
criticized President Obama and his Iran Deal. One representative email suggested that "you're going to lose a lot of Democrats if you keep writing stuff like this."
I usually ask such correspondents to let me know which facts or logic they disagree with in the positions we express about the Iran Deal. Inevitably, I get
either no answer or something like, "I support the President and think it's a good agreement."
Thus the Iran Deal raises a serious question for Jewish Democrats—which the majority of us Jews, of course, are. Namely, is the Iran Deal a Democratic initiative or an American initiative? Should we reflexively support this deal because the Republicans oppose
it—as is so often our inclination (and vice versa)?
As I have often noted in these letters, FLAME's small executive staff is evenly split between those who voted for President Obama twice and those who
didn't vote for him at all. More importantly our organization is non-partisan and thus our positions on U.S. Middle East policy and Israel are
developed based on the facts of the issues. In other words, we call 'em as we see 'em, regardless of which political party supports our judgment.
If ever there were a matter that deserves our—and your—dispassionate, non-partisan analysis, it's the Iran Deal. As we have seen over the past two weeks,
this is neither a Democratic issue nor a Republican one. Indeed, we are wise to treat any matter that regards Israel in the same way—above the partisan political fray. We need to ask ourselves—and ask our elected representatives—to evaluate the Iran Deal strictly on its merits.
Unfortunately, the President and many of his supporters, fearful and bitter at the prospect of losing Congressional approval of the Deal when it comes to a
vote in mid-September, have tried to make this a partisan issue—and worse, to accuse opponents of wanting war.
However, in the last two weeks numerous prominent, loyal Democrats have come out in strong opposition to the Deal.
Alcee Hastings, Democrat (and African American) Representative from Florida just announced he will oppose the Deal.
Staunch Obama and Israel supporter, Harvard Professor Alan Dershowitz just accused the President of having negotiated a horrible agreement.
J.B. Pritzker, Hillary Clinton's 2008 Presidential campaign co-chair just wrote an op-ed entitled, "True Bipartisanship—Oppose the Deal."
And last Tuesday, Robert Menendez, ranking Democrat Senator and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from New Jersey, gave a powerful
speech and wrote an op-ed in the New York Post explaining why he will oppose the Dead.
These Democrats oppose the Deal because they've studied its details and believe in their heart of hearts—no matter who authored and negotiated it—that it
is a bad agreement for the United States. Secondarily, they will often note that it is also bad for our Middle East allies, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia
and other Gulf states.
No my friends, the Iran Deal is not a Democrat Deal, it is an American Deal. We should oppose simply it because so much of it is wrong, because it is an historic mistake. And if you are a Democrat, you should especially oppose it, because it discredits the party and will cost
Democrats hugely in the next elections in terms of trust on foreign policy. Remember, recent polls confirm that a majority of Americans oppose the Iran Deal.
This week's featured FLAME Hotline article—an excerpt of Senator Menendez's speech last week—lays out the reasons and the alternative in very clear terms. Few members of Congress have supported the President more often or forcefully than Bob
Menendez—but not this time. Because this issue is different. If you are a Democrat who still supports this Deal, I implore you to read Mr.
Menendez's words before you make a final decision.
If you oppose this Deal, since the next few weeks are critical in the campaign to defeat the Iran Deal, even if you have already taken similar actions, I strongly encourage you to take two new actions right now, while you have this urgent
issue top of mind:
First, call and write your U.S. Senators and your Representative
expressing your opposition to the Iran Deal—especially since the Associated Press just revealed, outrageously, that as part of the Deal the world's
greatest cheater on nuclear agreements, Iran,
will be conducting nuclear inspections on itself
! Please also thank the Senators, especially Democratic Senators Schumer and Menendez, who have already lined up against it. You can reach your elected
officials by calling Congress at 202-225-3121. You can email them very easily by going to Contacting the Congress. Tell them you oppose the Iran Deal because a) it doesn't prevent Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons, b) it allows Iran to investigate itself and c) it makes war more likely. Do this today.
Second, please send a pledge of support to FLAME as we launch a new hasbarah initiative
in media nationwide. Our editorial message is titled "A Cheater's Dream—Can't Trust, Can't Verify" and has
already begun to run in media nationwide. This message outlines Iran's long pattern of lying and deceit in the face of nearly every international
agreement, especially those related to its nuclear activity. With your help, we will double the media in which we run this ad and we will help
convince the American people—and Congress—to reject this deadly deal. Please go to
In the meantime, I thank you for your support of FLAME and of Israel during this critical time.
Vice President, Facts and Logic About the Middle East (FLAME)
Why I Will Vote Against the Iran Deal
By Senator Robert Menendez (D), New Jersey, excerpted from
a speech made at Seton Hall University
, August18, 2015
"For twenty three years as a member of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees, I have had the privilege of dealing with major
foreign policy and national security issues. Many of those have been of a momentous nature. This is one of those moments.
"I come to the issue of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [ed. JCPOA], with Iran, as someone who has followed Iran's nuclear ambition for the
better part of two decades. I decide on whether to support or oppose an issue on the basis of whether, it is in my judgment, in the national interest and
security of our country to do so.
"In this case a secondary, but important, question is what it means for our great ally—the State of Israel—and our other partners in the Gulf.
"Unlike President Obama's characterization of those who have raised serious questions
about the agreement, or who have opposed it, I did not vote for the war in Iraq, I opposed it, unlike the Vice President and the Secretary of State, who
both supported it. My vote against the Iraq war was unpopular at the time, but it was one of the best decisions I have ever made.
"I also don't come to this question as someone, unlike many of my Republican colleagues, who reflexively oppose everything the President proposes. In fact,
I have supported President Obama, according to Congressional Quarterly, 98 percent of the time in 2013 and 2014. My dear, late mother would have been happy
if I had agreed with her 98 percent of the time—and I revered her.
"On key policies ranging from voting in the Finance Committee and on the Senate Floor for the Affordable Care Act, to Wall Street Reform, to supporting the
President's Supreme Court Nominees and defending the Administration's actions on the Benghazi tragedy, his Pivot to Asia, shepherding the authorization for
the Use of Military Force (AUMF) to stop President Assad's use of chemical weapons, during the time I was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, to so much more, I have been a reliable supporter of President Obama.
"But my support is not—and has not been driven by party loyalty, but rather by principled agreement, not political expediency. When I have disagreed it is
also based on principled disagreement.
"The issue before the Congress in September is whether to vote to approve or disapprove
the agreement struck by the President and our P5+1 partners with Iran. This is one of the most serious national security, nuclear nonproliferation, arms
control issues of our time. It is not an issue of supporting or opposing the President. This issue is much greater and graver than that.
"For me, I have come to my decision after countless hours in hearings, classified briefings, and hours-and-hours of serious discussion and thorough
analysis. I start my analysis with the question: Why does Iran—which has the world's fourth largest proven oil reserves, with 157 billion barrels of crude
oil and the world's second largest proven natural gas reserves with 1,193 trillion cubic feet of natural gas—need nuclear power for domestic energy?
"We know that despite the fact that Iran claims their nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, they have violated the international will, as expressed by
various U.N. Security Council Resolutions, and by deceit, deception and delay advanced their program to the point of being a threshold nuclear state. It is
because of these facts, and the fact that the world believes that Iran was weaponizing its nuclear program at the Parchin Military Base—as well as
developing a covert uranium enrichment facility in Fordow, built deep inside of a mountain, raising serious doubts about the peaceful nature of their
civilian program, and their sponsorship of state terrorism—that the world united against Iran's nuclear program.
Our Original Purpose: Dismantle Iran's Nuclear Infrastructure
"In that context, let's remind ourselves of the stated purpose of our negotiations with Iran: Simply put, it was to dismantle all—or significant parts—of
Iran's illicit nuclear infrastructure to ensure that it would not have nuclear weapons capability at any time. Not shrink its infrastructure. Not limit it.
But fully dismantle Iran's nuclear weapons capability.
"We said we would accommodate Iran's practical national needs, but not leave the region-and the world-facing the threat of a nuclear armed Iran at a time
of its choosing. In essence, we thought the agreement would be roll-back-for-roll-back: you roll-back your infrastructure and we'll roll-back our
"At the end of the day, what we appear to have is a roll-back of sanctions and Iran only limiting its capability, but not dismantling it or rolling it
back. What do we get? We get an alarm bell should they decide to violate their commitments, and a system for inspections to verify their compliance. That,
in my view, is a far cry from 'dismantling.'
"I recall in the early days of the Administration's overtures to Iran,
asking Secretary of State, John Kerry, at a meeting of Senators, about dismantling Arak, Iran's plutonium reactor. His response was swift and certain. He
said: 'They will either dismantle it or we will destroy it.'
"I remember that our understanding was that the Fordow facility was to be closed—that it was not necessary for a peaceful civilian nuclear program to have
an underground enrichment facility. That the Iranians would have to come absolutely clean about their weaponization activities at Parchin and agree to
promise anytime anywhere inspections.
"We now know all of that fell by the wayside. But what we cannot dismiss is that we have now abandoned our long-held policy of preventing nuclear
proliferation and are now embarked—not on preventing nuclear proliferation—but on managing or containing it—which leaves us with a far less desirable, less
secure, and less certain world order. So, I am deeply concerned that this is a significant shift in our nonproliferation policy, and about what it will
mean in terms of a potential arms race in an already dangerous region.
"While I have many specific concerns about this agreement, my overarching concern is that it requires no dismantling of Iran's nuclear infrastructure and
only mothballs that infrastructure for 10 years. Not even one centrifuge will be destroyed under this agreement. Fordow will be repurposed, and Arak
"The fact is—everyone needs to understand what this agreement does and does not do so that they can determine whether providing Iran permanent relief in
exchange for short-term promises is a fair trade.
"This deal does not require Iran to destroy or fully decommission a single
uranium enrichment centrifuge. In fact, over half of Iran's currently operating centrifuges will continue to spin at its Natanz facility. The remainder,
including more than 5,000 operating centrifuges and nearly 10,000 not yet functioning, will merely be disconnected and transferred to another hall at
Natanz, where they could be quickly reinstalled to enrich uranium.
"And yet we, along with our allies, have agreed to lift the sanctions and allow billions of dollars to flow back into Iran's economy. We lift sanctions,
but—even during the first 10 years of the agreement—Iran will be allowed to continue R&D activity on a range of centrifuges—allowing them to improve
their effectiveness over the course of the agreement.
"Clearly, the question is: What do we get from this agreement in terms of what we originally sought? We lift sanctions, and—at year eight—Iran can actually
start manufacturing and testing advanced IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges that enrich up to 15 times the speed of its current models. At year 15, Iran can start
enriching uranium beyond 3.67 percent—the level at which we become concerned about fissile material for a bomb. At year 15, Iran will have NO limits on its
Permanent Sanctions Relief for Temporary Limitations on Iran's Nuclear Program
"This deal grants Iran permanent sanctions relief in exchange for only temporary—temporary—limitations on its nuclear program—not a rolling-back, not
dismantlement, but temporary limitations. At year ten, the UN Security Council Resolution will disappear along with the dispute resolution mechanism needed
to snapback UN sanctions and the 24-day mandatory access provision for suspicious sites in Iran.
"The deal enshrines for Iran, and in fact commits the international community to assisting Iran in developing an industrial-scale nuclear power program,
complete with industrial scale enrichment. While I understand that this program will be subject to Iran's obligations under the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, I think it fails to appreciate Iran's history of deception in its nuclear program and its violations of the NPT.
"It will, in the long run, make it much harder to demonstrate that Iran's program is not in fact being used for peaceful purposes because Iran will have
legitimate reasons to have advanced centrifuges and a robust enrichment program. We will then have to demonstrate that its intention is dual-use and not
justified by its industrial nuclear power program.
"What we get in return for removing sanctions is an inspection and verification regime
of Iran's somewhat-diminished, but still existent nuclear program, for which we will have to depend on Iranian compliance and performance for years to
"A significant part of that performance is dictated by an Additional Protocol of the IAEA agreement that ensures access to suspect sites in a country. But
Iran has agreed only to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol and only formally adopt it when Congress has abolished all sanctions. This could mean
that if Iran has been sanctioned for violations of the agreement, Iran won't even have to seek ratification of the Additional Protocol until those
sanctions have been lifted—regardless of Iran's full compliance.
"This is hardly an ironclad commitment on which to base our right to inspect suspicious facilities. Of course if the Iranians violate the agreement and try
to make a dash for a nuclear bomb, our solace will be that we will have a year's notice instead of the present 3 months. So in reality we have purchased a
very expensive alarm system. Maybe we'll have an additional nine months, but with much greater consequences in the enemy we might face at that time.
"But what happens in the interim?
Within about a year of Iran meeting its initial obligations, Iran will receive sanctions relief to the tune of $100-150 billion in the release of frozen
assets, as well as renewed oil sales of another million barrels a day, as well as relief from sectoral sanctions in the petrochemical, shipping,
shipbuilding, port sectors, gold and other precious metals, and software and automotive sectors.
"Iran will also benefit from the removal of designated entities including major banks, shipping companies, oil and gas firms from the U.S. Treasury list of
* * *
'The U.S. Administration, acting consistently with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from re-introducing or reimposing
sanctions specified in Annex II, that it has ceased applying under this JCPOA.'
"I repeat, we will have to refrain from reintroducing or reimposing the Iran Sanctions Act I authored—which expires next year—that acted significantly to
bring Iran to the table in the first place. In two hearings, I asked Treasury Secretary Lew and Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman whether we have the
right to reauthorize sanctions to have something to snapback to, and neither would answer the question, saying only that it was 'too early' to discuss
"But, I did get my answer from the Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations who, in a letter dated July 25, 2015, said:
'It is clearly spelled out in the JCPOA that both the European Union and the United States will refrain from reintroducing or reimposing the sanctions and
restrictive measures lifted under the JCPOA. It is understood the reintroduction or reimposition, including through extension of the sanctions and
restrictive measures will constitute significant nonperformance which would relieve Iran from its commitments in part or in whole.'
"If anything is a 'fantasy' about this agreement it is the belief that snapback,
without congressionally-mandated sanctions, with EU sanctions gone, and companies from around the world doing permissible business in Iran, will have any
"The Administration cannot argue sanction policy both ways. Either they were effective in getting Iran to the negotiating table or they were not. Sanctions
are either a deterrent to break-out, a violation of the agreement, or they are not.
* * *
"If there is a fear of war in the region, it is fueled by Iran and its proxies and exacerbated by an agreement that allows Iran to possess an
industrial-sized nuclear program, and enough money in sanctions relief to continue to fund its hegemonic intentions throughout the region. Imagine how a
country like the United Arab Emirates—sitting just miles away from Iran across the straits of Hormuz feels after they sign a civilian nuclear agreement
with the U.S., considered to be the gold standard, to not enrich or reprocess uranium? What do our friends think when we give our enemies a pass while
holding them to the gold standard? Who should they trust?
"Which brings me to another major concern with the JCPOA, namely the issue of Iran coming clean about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear
program. For well over a decade, the world has been concerned about the secret weaponization efforts Iran conducted at the military base called Parchin.The
goal that we have long sought, along with the international community, is to know what Iran accomplished at Parchin-not necessarily to get Iran to declare
culpability—but to determine how far along they were in their nuclear weaponization program so that we know what signatures to look for in the future.
* * *
"With so much at stake, the IAEA -- after waiting over ten years to inspect Parchin,
speak to Iranian nuclear scientists, and review additional materials and documents—are now told they will not have direct access to Parchin. The list of
scientists the P5+1 wanted the IAEA to interview were rejected outright by Iran, and they are now given three months to do all of their review and analysis
before they must deliver a report in December of this year. How the inspections and soil and other samples are to be collected are outlined in two secret
agreements that the U.S. Congress is not privy to. The answer as to why we cannot see those documents, is because they have a confidentiality agreement
between the IAEA and Iran, which they say 'is customary,' but this issue is anything but customary.
"If Iran can violate its obligations for more than a decade, it can't then be allowed to avail themselves of the same provisions and protections they
violated in the first place. We have to ask: Why would our negotiators decide to negotiate access to other IAEA documents, but not these documents? Maybe
the reason, as some members of Congress and public reports have raised, is because it will be the Iranians and not the IAEA performing the tests and
providing the samples to be analyzed, which would be the equivalent of having an athlete accused of using performance enhancing drugs submit an
unsupervised urine sample to the appropriate authority. Chain of custody doesn't matter when the evidence given to you is prepared by the perpetrator.
"So in five months, we seek to resolve a major issue that has taken the better part of a decade to have access to, and with a highly questionable
inspection regime as a solution. And, according to an AP story of August 14th - and I quote:
'They say the agency will be able to report in December. But that assessment is unlikely to be unequivocal because chances are slim that Iran will present
all the evidence the agency wants, or give it the total freedom of movement it needs to follow-up the allegations. Still, the report is expected to be
approved by the IAEA's board, which includes the United States and other powerful nations that negotiated the July 14 agreement. They do not want to upend
their July 14 deal, and will see the December report as closing the books on the issue.'
"It would seem to me that what we are doing is sweeping this critical issue
under the rug.
"Secretary Kerry has said that, 'We have absolute knowledge with respect to the certain military activities they were engaged in,' yet, for years we have
insisted on getting access to Parchin and acquiring the knowledge we need to know.
* * *
"Mark Dubowitz, the widely-respected sanctions expert from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, has said:
'For Secretary Kerry to claim we have absolute knowledge of Iran's weaponization activities is to assume a level of U.S. intelligence capability that
defies historical experience. That's why he, President Obama, Undersecretary Sherman and IAEA chief Amano all have made PMD resolution such an essential
condition of any nuclear deal.'
"He goes on to say:
'The U.S. track record in detecting and stopping countries from going nuclear should make Kerry more modest in his claims and assumptions. The U.S. missed
the Soviet Union, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. Washington underestimated Saddam's program in 1990. Then it overestimated his program in
2003 and went to war to stop a nonexistent WMD program.'
"It is precisely because of this track record that permitting Iran to have the size and scope of an industrialized nuclear program, permitted under the
JCPOA is one of the great flaws of the agreement.
* * *
If Iran Cheats, What Are Our Options?
"The fact is—success is not a question of Iran's conforming and performing according to the agreement. If that was all that was needed—if Iran had abided
by its commitments all along—we wouldn't be faced with this challenge now. The test of success must be—if Iran violates the agreement and attempts to
break-out—how well we will be positioned to deal with Iran—at that point. Trying to reassemble the sanctions regime, including the time to give countries
and companies notice of sanctionable activity, which had been permissible up to then, would take up most of the breakout time, assuming we could even get
compliance after significant national and private investments had taken place. That indeed would be a 'fantasy.'
"So the suggestion of 'permanency' in stopping Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon depends on 'performance.' Based on the long history of Iran's broken
promises, defiance and violations, that is hopeful. Significant dismantlement, however, would establish 'performance,' and therefore eliminating the threat
of the capability to develop a nuclear weapon would truly be permanent, and any attempt to rebuild that infrastructure would give the world far more time
than one year.
"The President and Secretary Kerry have repeatedly said that the choice is between this agreement or war. I reject that proposition, as have most
witnesses, including past and present Administration members involved in the Iran nuclear issue, who have testified before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and who support the deal but reject the binary choice between the agreement or war.
"If the P5+1 had not achieved an agreement, would we be at war with Iran? I don't believe that.
"For all those who have said they have not heard—from anyone who opposes the Agreement—a better solution, they're wrong. I believe there is a pathway to a better deal.
* * *
"We should direct the Administration to re-negotiate by authorizing the continuation of negotiations and the Joint Plan of Action—including Iran's $700
million-a-month lifeline, which to date have accrued to Iran's benefit to the tune of $10 billion, and pausing further reductions of purchases of Iranian
oil and other sanctions pursuant to the original JPOA. I'm even willing to consider authorizing a sweetener—a one-time release of a predetermined amount of
funds—as a good faith down payment on the negotiations.
"We can provide specific parameters for the Administration to guide their continued negotiations and ensure that a new agreement does not run afoul of
Congress. A continuation of talks would allow the re-consideration of just a few, but a critical few issues, including:
the immediate ratification by Iran of the Additional Protocol to ensure that we have a permanent international arrangement with Iran for access to suspect
a ban on centrifuge R&D for the duration of the agreement to ensure that Iran won't have the capacity to quickly breakout, just as the U.N. Security
Council Resolution and sanctions snapback is off the table.
close the Fordow enrichment facility. The sole purpose of Fordow was to harden Iran's nuclear program to a military attack. We need to close the facility
and foreclose Iran's future ability to use this facility. If Iran has nothing to hide they shouldn't need to put it under a mountain.
the full resolution of the 'possible military dimensions' of Iran's program. We need an arrangement that isn't set up to whitewash this issue. Iran and the
IAEA must resolve the issue before permanent sanctions relief, and failure of Iran to cooperate with a comprehensive review should result in automatic
extend the duration of the agreement. One of the single most concerning elements of the deal is its 10-15 year sunset of restrictions on Iran's program,
with off ramps starting after year eight. We were promised an agreement of significant duration and we got less than half of what we are looking for. Iran
should have to comply for as long as they deceived the world's position, so at least 20 years.
we need agreement now about what penalties will be collectively imposed by the P5+1 for Iranian violations, both small and midsized, as well as a clear
statement as to the so-called grandfather clause in paragraph 37 of the JCPOA, to ensure that the U.S. position about not shielding contracts entered into
legally upon re-imposition of sanctions is shared by our allies.
"At the same time we should: Extend the authorization of the Iran Sanctions Act which expires in 2016 to ensure that we have an effective snapback option;
Consider licensing the strategic export of American oil to allied countries struggling with supply because Iranian oil remains off the market; Immediately
implement the security measures offered to our partners in the Gulf Summit at Camp David, while preserving Israel's qualitative military edge.
"Whether or not the supporters of the agreement admit it, this deal is based on 'hope'—hope that when the nuclear sunset clause expires Iran will have succumbed to the benefits of commerce and global integration. Hope that the hardliners
will have lost their power and the revolution will end its hegemonic goals. And hope that the regime will allow the Iranian people to decide their fate.
"Hope is part of human nature, but unfortunately it is not a national security strategy.
"The Iranian regime, led by the Ayatollah, wants above all to preserve the regime and its Revolution, unlike the Green Revolution of 2009. So it stretches
incredulity to believe they signed on to a deal that would in any way weaken the regime or threaten the goals of the Revolution.
"I understand that this deal represents a trade-off, a hope that things may be different in Iran in ten-15 years. Maybe Iran will desist from its nuclear
ambitions. Maybe they'll stop exporting and supporting terrorism. Maybe they'll stop holding innocent Americans hostage. Maybe they'll stop burning
American flags. And maybe their leadership will stop chanting, "Death to America" in the streets of Tehran. Or maybe they won't.
"I know that, in many respects, it would be far easier to support this deal, as it would have been to vote for the war in Iraq at the time. But I didn't
choose the easier path then, and I'm not going to now. I know that the editorial pages that support the agreement would be far kinder, if I voted yes, but
they largely also supported the agreement that brought us a nuclear North Korea.
"At moments like this, I am reminded of the passage in John F. Kennedy's book,
'Profile in Courage,' where he wrote:
"'The true democracy, living and growing and inspiring, puts its faith in the people - faith that the people will not simply elect men who will represent
their views ably and faithfully, but will also elect men (and I would parenthetically add woman) who will exercise their conscientious judgment—faith that
the people will not condemn those whose devotion to principle leads them to unpopular courses, but will reward courage, respect honor, and ultimately
"'In whatever arena in life one may meet the challenges of courage, whatever may be the sacrifices he faces if he follows his conscience—the loss of his
friends, his fortune, his contentment, even the esteem of his fellow men—each man must decide for himself the course he will follow. The stories of past
courage can define that ingredient—they can teach, they can offer hope, they can provide inspiration. But they cannot supply courage itself. For this each
man must look into his own soul.'
"I have looked into my own soul and my devotion to principle may once again lead me to an unpopular course, but if Iran is to acquire a nuclear bomb, it
will not have my name on it.
"It is for these reasons that I will vote to disapprove the agreement and, if called upon, would vote to override a veto.
"Thank you. May God Bless these United States of America."