Dear Friend of Israel:
Things are not going well for the Iran Disarmament Deal. The deadline for a final settlement was supposed to be today, but for reasons you'll see in a
moment, that deadline has been postponed "a few days," according to U.S. negotiators.
First, ten days ago, in complete contradiction to everything the U.S. and Western allies have demanded from the beginning, Iran's parliament voted to forbid access to military sites, documents and its nuclear scientists as part of the disarmament deal. (Need I mention that during this session
Iranian lawmakers were shouting "Death to America!"?)
In case we didn't get the message, just a few days later, Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, fulminated about the Iran Deal, demanding that all sanctions be lifted before Iran takes step one to dismantle its nuclear infrastructure and refusing any freeze on the country's nuclear
enrichment over the next decade—both of which also invalidate the "preliminary understanding" announced in April.
On the other side, voices in the U.S. and abroad have grown shriller in expressing alarm about the increasing scariness of making a bad deal with Iran, one
of the worst behaving and least trustworthy state actors in modern history.
A spate of articles have appeared in national media over the past two weeks decrying the deal—most cogent among them a piece in (of all places!) The New York Times by Professor Alan J. Kuperman, called "The Iran Deal's Fatal Flaw," in which he provides evidence that
the deal's much vaunted one-year "breakout period" for Iran to ramp up to a nuclear weapon would actually only be three months.
These objections are based on the published preliminary understanding and leaks that have issued since then, but suffice it to say that Secretary of State
Kerry has been trying to minimize expectations. Most recently he's been telling the press it's not so important that Iran tell us about its past nuclear weapons development, another provision that was once a cornerstone of the deal.
But the one published piece that should raise big red flags for every thinking American is the open letter to President Obama by a long bipartisan list of 19 diplomats, nuclear negotiators and former members of Mr. Obama's own advisory team (!), expressing fear of a bad deal with
Iran and laying out the bare minimum requirements for a good one.
We've reprinted this powerful letter as this week's FLAME Hotline featured article (see below). It will give you all the ammunition you need to evaluate the deal when it's announced over this coming week. It will also help you compose your opinions on
the deal—which I strongly urge you to deliver to your U.S. Representative and Senators.
This Iran Deal is one of the most important events in our generation. It has the outside potential to eliminate one of the greatest threats to world peace—and to Israel's existence—but it bears the more likely possibility of empowering with nuclear terror one of the most deadly-dangerous forces the
world has ever known.
Please take just five minutes to review this letter. Then get ready to act next week.
Thanks for your support of FLAME and of Israel!
Vice President, Facts and Logic About the Middle East (FLAME)
How to Deter and Dissuade Iran from Building a Nuclear Weapon
A Public Statement on U.S. Policy Toward the Iran Nuclear Negotiations—Endorsed by a Bipartisan Group of 19 American Diplomats, Legislators, Policymakers,
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 24, 2015
Over the last three years, members of this bipartisan group have convened regularly under the auspices of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
to discuss the status of the Iran nuclear issue, frequently benefitting from the input of current Administration officials. Last week, at its most
recent meeting, the group determined that it could usefully contribute to the public debate on the ongoing negotiations by presenting its consensus
view of critical issues. This statement reflects that broad consensus.
The Iran nuclear deal is not done. Negotiations continue. The target deadline is June 30.
We know much about the emerging agreement. Most of us would have preferred a stronger agreement.
The agreement will not prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapons capability. It will not require the dismantling of Iran's nuclear enrichment
infrastructure. It will however reduce that infrastructure for the next 10 to 15 years. And it will impose a transparency, inspection, and consequences
regime with the goal of deterring and dissuading Iran from actually building a nuclear weapon.
The agreement does not purport to be a comprehensive strategy towards Iran. It does not address Iran's support for terrorist organizations (like Hezbollah
and Hamas), its interventions in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen (its "regional hegemony"), its ballistic missile arsenal, or its oppression of its own
people. The U.S. administration has prioritized negotiations to deal with the nuclear threat, and hopes that an agreement will positively
influence Iranian policy in these other areas.
Even granting this policy approach, we fear that the current negotiations, unless concluded along the lines outlined in this paper and buttressed by a
resolute regional strategy, may fall short of meeting the administration's own standard of a "good" agreement.
We are united in our view that to maximize its potential for deterring and dissuading Iran from building a nuclear weapon, the emerging nuclear agreement
must - in addition to its existing provisions - provide the following:
1. Monitoring and Verification
The inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (the "IAEA") charged with monitoring compliance with the agreement must have timely and effective
access to any sites in Iran they need to visit in order to verify Iran's compliance with the agreement. This must include military (including IRGC) and
other sensitive facilities. Iran must not be able to deny or delay timely access to any site anywhere in the country that the inspectors need to visit in
order to carry out their responsibilities.
2. Possible Military Dimensions
The IAEA inspectors must be able, in a timely and effective manner, to take samples, to interview scientists and government officials, to inspect sites,
and to review and copy documents as required for their investigation of Iran's past and any ongoing nuclear weaponization activities ("Possible Military
Dimensions" or "PMD"). This work needs to be accomplished before any significant sanctions relief.
3. Advanced Centrifuges
The agreement must establish strict limits on advanced centrifuge R&D, testing, and deployment in the first ten years, and preclude the rapid technical
upgrade and expansion of Iran's enrichment capacity after the initial ten-year period. The goal is to push back Iran's deployment of advanced centrifuges
as long as possible, and ensure that any such deployment occurs at a measured, incremental pace consonant with a peaceful nuclear program.
4. Sanctions Relief
Relief must be based on Iran's performance of its obligations. Suspension or lifting of the most significant sanctions must not occur until the IAEA
confirms that Iran has taken the key steps required to come into compliance with the agreement. Non-nuclear sanctions (such as for terrorism) must remain
in effect and be vigorously enforced.
5. Consequences of Violations
The agreement must include a timely and effective mechanism to re-impose sanctions automatically if Iran is found to be in violation of the agreement,
including by denying or delaying IAEA access. In addition, the United States must itself articulate the serious consequences Iran will face in that event.
Most importantly, it is vital for the United States to affirm that it is U.S. policy to prevent Iran from producing sufficient fissile material for a
nuclear weapon—or otherwise acquiring or building one—both during the agreement and after it expires. Precisely because Iran will be left as a nuclear
threshold state (and has clearly preserved the option of becoming a nuclear weapon state), the United States must go on record now that it is committed to
using all means necessary, including military force, to prevent this. The President should declare this to be U.S. policy and Congress should formally
endorse it. In addition, Congressional review of any agreement should precede any formal action on the agreement in the United Nations.
Without these features, many of us will find it difficult to support a nuclear agreement with Iran.
We urge the U.S. administration not to treat June 30 as an "inviolable" deadline. Stay at the negotiating table until a "good" agreement that includes
these features is reached. Extend the existing Joint Plan of Action while negotiations continue. This will freeze Iran's nuclear activity and international
sanctions at current levels. While the United States should extend the Iran Sanctions Act so it does not expire, it should not increase sanctions while
negotiations continue. U.S. alternatives to an agreement are unappealing, but Iran's are worse. It has every incentive to reach an agreement and obtain
relief from sanctions and international isolation well in advance of its elections next February. If anyone is to walk out of the negotiations, let it be
Some argue that any nuclear agreement now simply further empowers bad Iranian behavior. And there is a lot to this argument. This is why we believe that
the United States must bolster any agreement by doing more in the region to check Iran and support our traditional friends and allies.
This does not mean major U.S. ground combat operations in the Middle East.
But it does mean taking initiatives like the following:
1. In Iraq
Expand training and arming not only of Iraqi Security Forces but also Kurdish Peshmerga in the north and vetted Sunni forces in the West. Allow U.S.
Special Forces to leave their bases and help coordinate air strikes and stiffen Iraqi units. Sideline Iranian-backed militia and separate them from Shiite
units ("popular mobilization units") that are not under Iranian control.
2. In Syria
Expand and accelerate the U.S. train and equip programs. Work with Turkey to create a safe haven in northern Syria where refugees can obtain humanitarian
aid and vetted non-extremist opposition fighters can be trained and equipped. Capitalize on Bashar al-Assad's increasing weakness to split off regime
elements and seek to join them with U.S. trained opposition elements. Interdict the transshipment of Iranian weapons into Syria in coordination with the
Kurds and Turkey, and consider designating as terrorist organizations Iranian-backed Shiite militias responsible for egregious atrocities.
3. In Yemen
Expand support for Saudi Arabia and the UAE in pressuring the warring parties to the negotiating table while seeking to split the Houthi elements away from
Interdict Iranian arms bound for extremist groups and continue to counter its efforts to harass commercial shipping and our naval forces. Reaffirm U.S.
policy to oppose Iran's efforts to subvert local governments and project its power at the expense of our friends and allies.
Collectively, these steps also strengthen U.S. capability against Daesh (the misnamed "Islamic State"). Acting against both Iranian hegemony and Daesh's
caliphate will help reassure friends and allies of America's continued commitment. And it will help address Israel's legitimate concerns that a nuclear
agreement will validate Iran's nuclear program, further facilitate its destabilizing behavior, and encourage further proliferation at a time when Israel
faces the possible erosion of its "qualitative military edge." We urge the U.S. administration to create a discreet, high-level mechanism with the Israeli
government to identify and implement responses to each of these concerns.
Taking the actions we propose while the nuclear negotiations continue will reinforce the message that Iran must comply with any agreement and will not be
allowed to pursue a nuclear weapon. This will increase, not decrease, the chance that Iran will comply with the agreement and may ultimately adopt a more
constructive role in the region. For the U.S. administration's hopes in this respect have little chance so long as Iran's current policy seems to be
succeeding in expanding its influence.
Graham Allison, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Howard Berman, U.S. House of Representatives (D-CA), 1983-2013
Robert Blackwill, deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security advisor for strategic planning under President George W. Bush, 2003-2004
General James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007-2011
Patrick Clawson, Morningstar Senior Fellow, director of research, The Washington Institute
Paula J. Dobriansky, undersecretary of state for global affairs, 2001-2009
Robert Einhorn, special advisor to the Secretary of State for nonproliferation and arms control, 2009-2013
Norman Eisen, U.S. ambassador to the Czech Republic, 2011-2014
Michael Eisenstadt, Kahn Fellow, director of the Military and Security Studies Program, The Washington Institute
Stephen Hadley, national security advisor to President George W. Bush, 2005-2009
Olli Heinonen, deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 2005-2010
Simon Henderson, Baker Fellow, director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program, The Washington Institute
James Jeffrey, U.S. ambassador to Iraq, 2010-2012, deputy national security advisor to President George W Bush, 2007-2008. Philip Solondz Distinguished Fellow, The
Joseph Lieberman, U.S. Senate (I-CT), 1989-2013
David Makovsky, senior policy advisor to the U.S. special envoy for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations (2013-2014). Ziegler Distinguished Fellow and director of the
Project on the Middle East Peace Process, The Washington Institute
David Petraeus, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 2011-2012
Dennis Ross, special assistant to President Obama and National Security Council senior director for the central region, 2009-2011. Counselor and William Davidson
Distinguished Fellow, The Washington Institute
Gary Samore, coordinator for arms control and weapons of mass destruction under President Obama, 2009-2013
Robert Satloff, Howard P. Berkowitz Chair in U.S. Middle East Policy and executive director, The Washington Institute